The Recovery of Money Paid to a Bona Fide Holder for Value of a Foreign Negotiable Instrument by Hurley, Jeremiah Joseph
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection Historical Cornell Law School
1893
The Recovery of Money Paid to a Bona Fide
Holder for Value of a Foreign Negotiable
Instrument
Jeremiah Joseph Hurley
Cornell Law School
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/historical_theses
Part of the Law Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Historical Cornell Law School at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital
Repository. For more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Hurley, Jeremiah Joseph, "The Recovery of Money Paid to a Bona Fide Holder for Value of a Foreign Negotiable Instrument" (1893).
Historical Theses and Dissertations Collection. Paper 303.
THE RECOVERY OF ::0TY PAID TO A BONA FIDE
HOLDER FOR VALUE OF A FORGED II2GOTIABLE INSTRUMENT
THESIS FOR THE DEGREE OF L. L. B.
JEREMIAH JOSEPH HTRLEY.
SCHOOL OF LAW
CORNELL UNIVERSITY.
JUNE, 1893.
C 0 11 T E U T S.
Introduction-- - - 3
Forgery of drawer's or customers signature - - 5
Forgery of indorserA signature -I-------- 13
Forgery by alteration of the in3trunment -I---- 15
Right to recover in general -I--------- 18
Conclusion----------------- -- - 26
Cases cited 28-- 
INTRODJCT IIO.
The law of commercial paper is handed down to us
moulded,shaped and directed by' the courts in their appli-
cation of customs rules and principles,many of which are
defined n what is knowm as the law merchant,others have
been added from time to time as iheessity demanded. Some
of these rules are rigid and arbitrary in their application,
others are based on equity reason and justice.
Ascommercial paper has become a medium of exchange be-
tween all parts of the civilized world,it is nucessary for
:ubli c
the protection of thr and the security of mercantile trans-
actions that it be surrounded and protected by unvarying
and well defined rules and principles. These securities e
early became the subject of counterfeiters and forgers,
as they were m I s l f g d an d altered than money.
We have in this treatise to deal with a branch of the com-
mercial law in reference to these instriments," The recovery
of money paid to a bona fide holder for value of a forged
negotiable instrUment",which both parties,the one paying
and the other receiving,thought to be genuine,but which
afterwards was found to be forged. The action is for mon3v
had a-d ,c ived vith- out c iAr.iovi. It is 4 a) ± .
tion of a ),1z i i 4 _ U 1
an innovation of the rules of the common laws
In all cases of actions on negotiable instr~ments
where the law is uncertain or the question undecided,there
is a tendency to eximine and to a great extent follow the
holdings in other jurisdictions. In the earl&y American
Courtsthe English decisions were quite uniformally followed.
justice Story in Swift v. Tyson(i6 Peters) truly says" It
is in a great measure not the law of a single country only
but the law of the commercial world". An Eng&lish court refers
to it as "The application of those general principles which
do not belong to the laws of any country but which we cannot
help giving effect to in the administration of justice".
It is the object in this treatise to reveiw the
authorities and show if possible on what principle'justice a
recovery is allowed in some cases and refused in others.
What actions or omissions of duty on the part of either will
prevent a recovery,and when two parties,both being innocent,
are deceived by mutual mistake who shall sustain the loss.
5WHERE THE SIGNATURE OF THE DRAWER OR CUSTOMER IS FORGED.
The principle is well settled in the jurusprudence
ofEngland and Americathat money paid under a mistake of fact
may be recovered back. It is immaterial whither or not the
party paying acted negligently or not. The negligence of
one party would give theAno right to retain what did not
belong to him. It is no difference that the party paying
had the means in his power to discover the mistake. In the
case of a life insurance company paying a life policy by
mistake, when by the lapse of payments of the premiun,the
policy had become void,which fact the directors,before pay-
ing,might have discovered by refering to their books.
The court held that they might recover the money back.
"It may be recovered back,generally speaking,however care-
less the party payfing may have been in omiting to use due
diligence to inquire into the fact. In such a case the
receiver was not entitled to it,or intended to pave it".
Kelly v.Solari ( 9 M 3 W. 54)
Chief Justice Hunt in Kingston Bank v. Eltinge(4o fl. Y. )
says care and diligence are not controlling elements in the
case. It is a question of fact merely,and if in consequence
of such mutual mistake one party has received the peoperty of
another,he must refund and this without reference to vigi-
lence or negligence. In applying these principles to nego-
tiable instr~ments the courts have diverged somewhat from
the general doctoring,though in all cases recognizing its
reason and justice, They seem to have taken upon themselves
the duty of holding negotiable paper to be an inviolable
security ,and for the benefit of the public subject it to
strict and arb -itrary rules of law.
More than two centuries ago the contrary to this
general principle was laid down by Lord Mansfield in Price v.
neal(3Burrows ) The action was one to recover money paid to
the holder of two bills of exchangeby the drawee therein
named,both parties at the time of payment thinking the
instrdiments were valid,both of which,several days afterwards
were found to be forged. Defendant was immediately notified
and the money demanded back. One of the instriments was
accepted by plaintiff before it was discounted by defendant,
the other was paid without acceptance. Neal obtained both
bills for value and in good faith. The right to retain the
money paid on the accepted bill was conceeded at the trial
by plaintiff. Mansfield made no distinction between the two
(as seems from the report of the case which is not very full)
but based his opinion on the rule "That it was incumbent on
the plaintiff to be satisfied that the bill drawn was in the
drawers hand before he accepted it or paid it", also"That
it wasnegligence on the part of the plaintiff and not on the
part of the defendant".
But why was the drawee in duty bound to know the signature
of the drawer? Wh.r ah-oud the law impute neEigence in the
drawee or estop him from showing his mistake?
Prof. Ames in 4 Harvard Law Review thinks that this and
like cases can ba suported on the principle,that as between
two persons having equal equities,one of whom must suffer
the legal title shall prevail. Mansfield said there was no
reason to throw off the loss from one innocent man upon
another innocent man,but it does not appear that he decided
the case on this point,but entirely on the neglect of Price
in failing to discover the forgery. Ames says"The holder
paid away his money when he bought the bill,the drawee parted
with his when he took the bill up".
- Can we say it is "unconscientious" in the holder to
retain the money of the drawee just because he paid away his
own on a worthless draft, and this before the drawee knew of Lt
existance? We might as well say it is equitable for a man
to retainmoney receeved from another by mistake in exchange
for counterfeit bank bills,unless we couple with it th at
other rule "That the drawee is bound to know the signature
of his drawer".Prof. Ames thought this did not enter into the
decision, could it be equitable for anybody to o~tain the
property of another without some consideration.
The decision says Justice Kent "Turned on the negligence
imput able to the one party and not to the other"(2 John. 46-)
He must know the signatureand if he is mistaken and the
other party is thereby put to any disadvantage ,he cannot
recover.
The ban ker paying a bill purporting to have been
accepted by their customer is put in the same position as
the drawee in reference to a recovery. They are held bound
to know his signature. This rule was laid down in another
leading English case,Sm-ith v. Mercer(6 Taunt) A banker paid
paid a bill on the forged acceptance of his customer. Some
time afterward on discovery of the forgery notiee was given
and the money demanded back from the defendant,the holder of
the bill. Judgment was given to the defendkit. The judges
were not unanimous in their reason for so holding,but all
however thought that the banker should know the signature of
his customer. Dallas J. rested his decision "on the want
of due caution in having paid the bill,the effect of which
was to give time to different parties",on the suposed fault
and neglect of the plaintiff,who oaght to hsve known the
signature of his customer. Mr. Chitty thinks the true
reason was given by Gibbs C. J. who thought the plaintiff
should not recover,"As by his act the defendant was put in a
worse position". His remedies against the indorsers were
lost by the neglect of the banker to give him notice of the
forgery. Where a banker took up a draft for thr honor of his
cistomer whosename as endorger was forged on the instrument
and on discovering the forgery gave notice ininedi:tely.
He was allowed to recover..,bbot J. thought the fault was not
in him alone but began with the holder. Though. the banker
9was negligent in not discovering the forgery of his customerg
name, Vhe case was not within the exception. He adds"where
all the negligence is on one sideit may be unfit to inquire
into the quantum,yet where there is any fault in the other
party and he cannot be said to be wholly innocent he ought
not to profit by the mistake into which he led the other,at
least if the mistake is discovered before any alter~ation in
the situation of the other party"Wilconson v. Johnston(3B&C.)
A later case in the same court refused a recovery where
the notice was given on the next day after payment and in
time to give notice of the dishonor of the b6ll to the indor-
Sers. Yet the court thought the holder was entitled to notice
on the very day of dishonor. Cocks v.Masterman (9 B. C.)
The justice of the strictness of this rule has been
questioned and much abated in later decisions.
These cases are quite uniformally followed in the
not
United States . There in in my knowledge a single case
where the rule laid down in Price v.Nealhas been entirely
repudiated,though shorn in many,and limited ti the exact
state of facts to which it was first applied. Itseams
to be a rule adopted on the groujnd of public policy, calculat-
ing there by to sustain and promote the confidence in and
negotiability of commercial securities.
the reason of the rule in the United States is
based entirely on the negligence of the party paying. Where
I0
both parties are entirely free from actual negligence in the
transaction,the law imputes negligence in the payor for not
known the name of his drawer or customer. Where the loss
can be tra~ed to the fault or neglect of either party it is
fixed upon him. Tn this light the principle seems to be
entirely just and equitable . Where a loss has been encounhe
ered and must be sustained by one of two innocent parties
hethrough whosemeans it has happened should be the one to
suffer,although innocently mistaken; rather than he who act-
enot only in good faith,but without even an imputation of
negligence. An early case in Pe~nsylvania laid down the rule
very strictly and refused a recovery,although notice of the
forgery was given on the day the pagment was made. Holding
that a bank pays a forged check at its perill .Levy v. Bank
(4 Dallas) This is probably the most extreme case in the
United States and remained the accepted doctoring of that
State till changed by statute, (78 Pa. St. 233) .
The rule has been applyed in the United States Court
to a bank cashing its own notes and failing for nineteen days
to discover that they were altered since issued. The bank
was held bound to know its own notes;as it had the means to
know whither they were genuine;and by accepting and paying
the altered notes they were concluded by their act,and could
not recover from the holder who was innocent of the altera-
tion and acted entirely in good faith. Story J. after thor-
II
oughly reveiwing th cases and authorities says "In respect tp
persons equally innocent where one is bound to know and act
upon his knowledge, and the other is not,there seems to be no
reasonfor burdining the latter with any loss in exoneration
of the former.There is nothing unconscious in retaining the
sm received from the bank in payment of such notes,which its
own acts have deliberately assumed to be genuine" I.S.Bank
v. Banl of GeorgiaTIO Wheat.). This case was decided on the
presumption that the holder acted entirely in good faith.
The question whither or not he suffered any loss by the mis-
take was not touched in the aase.
In Maryland the rule was upheld but was put on the loss
sustained by the holder in consequence of the mistake of the
drawee of thecheck. The bank presenting the check ,though
it took it from an intire stranger contrary to the usual
course of business,Vas protected. The receiving bank showed
that it acted on the payment made by the drawee bankand
that,if the drawee bank had discovered the forgery when the
check was presented as it was bound to do,the holder would
have suffered no loss, Bank v. Bank ( 30 Md. II).
In MIassachusetts the rule was applied to a person re-
ceiving and paying notes on which his own name was forged.
The case was put on the negligence of the payer or the
suposed maker. Barker J. stated the true rule to be:" That
the party receiving such notes must examine them as soon as
he has opportunity" which in this case was when they were
presented for payment "and return them immediatelyif he does
not he is negligent and negligence will defeat his cause of
action. If he pay them and continue silent,he kuld be con-
sidered as having addopted them", Glouchester v. Salem Bank
(17 Mass.) The doctoring was sustained in West Virgin-
ia on the same principle of negligence. The drawee or
maker may by the exercise of due care protect himself against
losses by forgery and if he pays such paper,purporting to be
drawn by him or on himthe law imputes negligence in him in so
doing. This imputation of negligence is based on the broad
principle,"That there shall be certainty in commercial trans-
actions,that the mercantile law shall be firm and stable and
that those who deal in commercial paper may know their
rights" , Johnston v. Bank(27W. Va.) a
Judge Allen in ( 46 N.Y. 77 ) deems the question to be
too well settled in the jurisdiction of the country to be
overruled or disregarded. He says"It has become a rule of
right and of action among commercial and business men, and
any interference with it would be mischievous".
It is well srttled as a rule of comnmercial law,that
where both parties are equallyinnocent and the holder is a
holder for value and the party paying is the imputed maker,
drawee or banker of the drawee,he cannot recover back from
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the party receiving,unlesshe give notice immediately and
before the other party has acted to his detriment on the
mistaking representation. He must not be negligent. And must
at his peril recognize the signature,his mistake in this
alone is sufficient,in the rule, to create an imputation of
neglect in him and this negligence alone is sufficient to
bar his recovery.
FORGERY OF INDORSBRS 3TG'IATIRE.
Where the signature of the indorser is forged, the
general rule is applicable and the drawee can recover.
The courts are inclined to limit the rule to the single
exception and not apply it to the analogous though slightly
different facts. lIe is bound to the knowledge of the custo-
mer6 or drawer's signature only and not that of other
parties to the instriment,who may be entire strangers to him.
Neither acceptance or payment at any time or under any cir-
cumstances guarantees that the first or any other indorsement
is genuine. The holder in presenting the instrument for
payment,onthe other hand, guarantees the genuineness of the
indorsements thereon. The party paying pays the instrOment
without consideration. The holder has neither right nor
title to it,as no title can pass by forged indorsement.
The title still remains in the original payee. It is a wrong*
ful act in the holder to present the bill of another to an
innocent drawee or maker,who pays it on the faith of the
indorsment of the one presenting it. Nevertheless the drawee
may be held liable if he acts negligently in giving notice
of the forgery,and the other party is thereby injured or put
in such a positnn as to make it unjust to require him to
refund( idwards on i3ills . Notes Vol. 2'P. 599.)
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In Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany (IHill) the drawee paid
a bill on which the name of the payee was forged. Here
each was in duty bound to inqufire into the validity of the
payee's signature. The equities of both parties were equal
It was the misfortune of both to be deceived,but the holder
had no title to the bill,the owner of which still has the
title and can recover despite the alteration ,if he is not
in fault. By payment the drawee is held only to know the
signature of the drawer. The court adds," No doubt the par-
ties were equally innocent from a moral point of view. The
conduct of both was in good faith and the negligence of both
the same,but the defendant have obtained the money of the
plaintiff without any consideration and must return it".
The equity of this rule is just and illustrates the falicy
in Prof. Ames rulethat where the equities are equal,the loss
should be left where the course of business puts it.
FORGERY BY ALTERATIOD OF THE INSTLU;1]TIT
The drawee or accepter is not bound to know the
contents of the instrument. He can always recover money paideA
avaltered bill or noteprovided however,that he acts with
due diligence after discovering the forgery. It makes no
difference that he accepted it in tht . altered form and
afterwards pays it. Nor is hts liability any dilferent if it
is altered after he accepts it and at time of payment fails
to discover the alteration. By the certification of a checkq
or the acceptance of a bill,the drawee guarantees that the
signature of the drawer is genuine,but not that the signature
of any other party to the bill is genuine. HE undertakes to
pay the bill of his drawer, but is not bound to pay any
other bill which purporting to be his drawers,is acceptei by
himunless it be a bill on which his drawers name is forged.
If he pays in good faith and without culpable negligence
on his parthe can recover the amount as money paid on
mistake of fact. It will nmt be such negligence,if he has
the means at hand by which he could immediately detect such
alteration,and neglects to use them. He is under no obligatin
to the holder to detect the forgery,unless it is patent on the
fase of the instrUment, Clew; v. Bank ( 89 N. Y. ).
The mere negligence in the party paying in not discovering
the alteration does not give the party receiving the right
16
to retain what is not his,when he has not been prejudiced by
want of duty in the other. In Bank of Commerce v. Trust
Association( 55 N. Y. ),the court puts this in a very clear
light.L ,"To render it compulsatory on the court to refuse
a correction of the mistake,the facts of the case must bring
it within the exception to the general rule. The rules of laW
in relation to the correction of mistake have been gradually
grown more liberal and are moulded so as to do equity bed
tween the parties. The exceptions that have been engrafted
upon the commercial law,it is not our purpose to disturb ,
but they should not be extended". This is the general ten-
dency of the American ciurts. It cannot be said to be in
conflict with the learned opinion of Story in the case of
the Georgia Bank (supra) where the bank was held bound by the
acceptance of its notes,altered after issue. Story refers to
the quasi public nature of the bank and consideres the whole
note as the signature of the bank. A bank being of such a
peculiar nature,the bank issuing it should be bound to know
each and every part of it. In that case the bank by cartain
letering on notes of different denominations could have
known that the ones in question were altered. The alteration
was apparent on the face of the note. The whole make up of&
bank note of necessity must be taken into cinsideration in
order to dedide as to it s genuineness. This is not so in
the case of ordinary securities,and if a party by mistake pay
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his ovm note which has be(r.n rAised after he delivered ithe
should not be bound by the paymentand will be allowed a
recovery,provided however he is not negligent in discovering
the mistake and notifying the other party before the latter
has been materially injured by the mistake
RIGHT TO REC0VER IN GENERAL.
Where the holder is negligent and misleads the
accepter or maker there is no reason why he should benefit
by the mistske of the latter. Why should a bona fide holder
be permitted to retain money which he received from another
by mistake ,when he did not act on the representation of the
other,and when he did not do all in his duty inreference to
the act of the Other? And this on an instriment which he
could not enforce by suit. Why should a party be bound by
his act in paying,whither he acted negligently in paying or
notif the other party is not thereby put in a worse posi-
tion,and the instriment was one that could not be enforsed
against him But the courts hold that a drawee must know
the signatur of his customer and a maker his own signature.
Beyond that a recovery will be allowed provided the holder is
not put in a worse position by the act of jyment.
If the holder is induced to act by the representations of the
other,whither these be made on his mistake as toThe facts or
not,and does act to his disadvantage or loss, and the repre-
sentations were made in reference to what the other was in du
ty bound to state or do,heclearly should be lible to answer
in damages to the holder. though a drawee is bound to know
the signature of his customer,and if he is mistakenhe is
presumed to be negligent. This is only a presumption and may
be rebutted by evedence of acts ofnegligence on the part of
the holder and,if the holder by his negligence has led the
drawee into the mistake,he should not recover.
Where the holder received several checks from a stranger
which checks were drawn on different banks,some of which he
found to be forged and had reason to believe that the one in
question was a forgery. He presented it at the counter of
pliintiff bank without making any expiation as to his sus-
pieions or the manner in which he obtained the check. The
check was paid by the drawee. A recovery was allowed. The
court recognized as law the rule holding the drawee bound to
a knowledge of the signature of his drawer,but distinguished
this case from it and but the responsibility on the holder
for missleading the bank paying by his negligence in not advi-
sing the bank of the circumstances in which it received the
check. Quincy v. Riker (71 Ill. ).
In a similar case Judge Maxwell of Nebraska laid down
the rule which seems to be a just and equitable one. "That
the bank to whom a check is presented by a stranger may
require his identification and proof that he is the lawful
holder. It must take the necessary steps to ascertain the
genuineness of the check, and the identy of the person pre-
senting it ,and in case of loss from such neglect will be the
party at fault. And the bank pawing had the right to rely
on the duty of the bank discounting. The paying bank had
a right to presume that the bank holding acted in due dilig-
ence". In this case the forgery was immediately discovered
and notice given on the saie day as payment was made.( 261,.
W. R. )
In Massachusetts the same rule was sustained,though
notice of the forgery was not given for twelve days after
payment. The position of the holder was not chamgedthere
being no indorsers on the bill. Here both parties were
held to be equally negligent and the drawee was allowed to
recover. Wells J. based his decision om the negligence of
the holder. He adds,"" In the absence 6f actual fault or
negligen cc on the part of the &4awee,his constructive
fault in not knowing the signature of the drawer and detec-
ting the forgery will not preclude his recovery from the one
who received the money with a knowledge of the forgery,or who
took the check under circumstances of suspicions without
proper precautionsor whoseconduct had been such as to mis-
lead the drawee or induce him to pay theche ck without the.
usual scrutiny or other precautions against fraud or mistake,
Bankv. Bangs 106 Mass..; To the same effect are 8STenn.
299; 63 Tex. 610; 4 Oh. St. 629.
The rule in Price v. Neal is well settled and should as
a matter of public policy be recognized.It should not be
extended beyond the single exception,of a holder without
fault,without negligence and for a valuable consideration.
It is equally clear that a holder by his own negligence can
put himself in such an ineqfitable position that it would be
u njust to permit him to retain what he received from an
innocent drawee by mistake and without giving any equivalent.
Except where the Person paying is bound to know the
signature and is concluded by his mistake, a party who by
misthke of fact pays money to the holder of a forged instri-
ment may recover and a party accepting such an instriment
will not be bound by the acceptancei.except,int-e first case
, when the party by the mistaken payment is put in such a
position that it would be irnequitable to make him refund,when
he has suffered some loss or lost some right by the action of
the party paying so that he could not be put in th,. same
position in which he would be if the billor note was dishon-
ored when presented for payment;in the second case when the
holder has taken the instUment on the faith og the acceptance
and has suffered loss by the reptesentation of the acceptor
that the bi 1 was good. So the party paying may, by his
negligence ingiv~rnnotice of the forgery after the discovery
thereof or by failure to examine the instrument within a
reasoneble time when he is in duty bound to make such an ex-
amination,be estoped from setting up the forgery. Even a
customer whosename has been forged or whose instriment hasbeen
altered arter issue even though he is not a party to th3
bill,mMbecome chargeable with the amount paid by his bank
on the instrUment. Where the bank returns the instruments
as vouchers together with a statement of the accountd.,the
customer or depositer was held bound to the bank by his
negligence in not examining the vouchers and accounts.
The court holding that he was in duty bound bythe r3gular
custom and business of banks to have done so within a
reasonable time. And what would be due diligence is a
question fbr the jury. Bank v. Morgan (117 U. S. )
In Smith v. Mercer ( supra ) P- 8. the change of
position in the defendant ,Gibb J. ,thought would be suffi-
cient reason for refusing a recovery " Bythe acts of the
plintiff the defendant is put in a worse position u . The
case of Price v. Neal might weel have been decided on the
same pointand for ought we know this question was consider-
ed by Mansfield , the meger report of the case do not show
conclusively on what ground it w as decided.
The Supreme Court of Lodsiana in a well considered case
allowed a recovery of money paid on a forged bill which had
been accepted by the drawvee,but accepted after the holder
hsd obtained it. The holder purched the bill before the
accepter became a party to it. His loss was incurred
through his own negligence and not through the fault or
I
negligence of the accepter Notice of the Ergery was irmme-
diately given and the holder suffered no loss by the ac-
ceptance . Thecourt said " If the defendant had purchased
the b ill on the faith of the acceptanee we would have no
dtfficulty in affirming the decision of the court below
but such are not the facts". This case was free from the
leading circLunstances of loss and delay so commonto the
cases following Price v. Neal,and though contrary to the
opinion of Mansfield and Story,made a just distinction
between a bill discounted before and one discounted after
acceptance. :.icleroy v . Bank ( 14 La. An. ).
Chitty laid down the same rule and further adds " It -ill
be found in examining the older cases that thare were facts
affording a distinction". The holder if he chose to take
the bill on the representation of the party presenting it
should not after his loas b- his own fault profit by the
mistake of another,when he has immediate notice of the
forgery and is thereby enabled to proceed against all other
parties to the bill.
In a resent case in Massachusetts where the check was
paid on presentation and the forgery was not discovered for
some months after a recovery was allowed, though the drawee
acted negligently in not discovering the forgery sooner,
but the holder had proceeded him in negligence when he
bought the check. It was shown that the holder was put
in no.- worse position than if the payment was refused when
the holder presented it for payment. Danvers v. Salem Bank
( 151 Mass. ). The rule is the same where a party paid a
note which purported to be drawn by him self. Welch v.
Goodwin ( 123 Mass. ). While in New York the acceptor of
an altered bill was held bound only reasonable diligence
in discover ing th -_ alteration,and within this will not
be bound for loss incarred by the other party on account
of the mistake? , White v. Bank ( 64 N. Y. 323).
But where the teller of a bank , when a check was presented
to him,which check purported to be accepted by him ,said the
certification was good,' It turned out to be a forgery.
The holder although he had paid the consideration for the-
checkbefore he presented it at the bank to find if it was
all right, might still have overtaken the forger and recov-
ered the money if the bank had not misnepresented the
certification. This fault alone in the circumsiances of
the case was held sufficient to preclude the bank from
recovering.( 50 N. Y. 575 ).
Vlherevthe parties are under the same obligations to
discover the forgerythey are bound to use only reasonable
diligen ce ,and if notice is given immediately. after dis-
covery the money can be recovered back. If the party is
negligent in giving notice after he discovers the forgery
he will be estoped from denying the genuinesess of the
instrument. United States v. Centl Bank ( 6 Fed. Rep. )
There there was a delay of about two months in discov-
ering the fotgery,the whole bill having be:rn forgedthe co"-r
said " I think it is answered by the fact that the defendai
had no recourse against any actual party to the bill, and
it does not appear that they have lost the means of recovep*
ing against the actual forgers by means of such delay".
Ryan v. Bank ( 12 Ontario ).
V rhat is a reasonable time will depend on the ci~eum tan-
ces of the case. " Mere space of time is not important
unless it is made to appear that the holder will be put to
more liability,trouble or expence by a restitu tion then
than if notice had beon received earlier", Bank v. Bank
( 30 N. E. Rep. 808).
C ON C L U S I 0 i
The later case s are li.iiting the rule given by
Mansfield in Price v. Neal and established by the earlier
cases in this countryand putdlng the right to recover on
the change of positio n of the holder . bit just what
change of position in the holder vwould justify the courts
in refusing a recovery of money paid on a forged instriment
is not yet settled. It is clear that where indorsers or
transferors are relieved by the fault of the I& rty paying
or where the holder retained the consideration given for
the bill till the drawee piad itand the party paying neg-
ligently failed to discover the forgery in time to prevent
the loss, a recovery would not be alloyed.
The question of what would constitute negligence suffi-
cient in any given case to bar a recovery muist be decided
in thelight of the ci-cumstances of tne case.
The following general principles might be dedLcted from
the cases:
I, where a payment has been made on a forged negotiable
instriment throughthe negligence of eithor party and the
other has suffered somie damage thereby, the loss will be
pat on the negligent party. The negligence of the drawee or
banker in not immediately discovering the forgery of the
name of the drawer or a stomer will be sufficient negli -
gemce to bar him from recovering back the money.
2'here both parties are equally innocent,a rcovory nay
be had in all cases,provided the k rty receiving the pay-
ment has not in the mean time sffered loss by the payment-.
3 , In all cases a recovery will be allowed,except where
the party paying is bound to det .ct the forgery,provided,
the party paying use ordinary diligc.mc2 indetecting the
fo-gery and in giving notice thereof to the holder,and
regardless of negligmee or diligence,when the holder has
not been put in a worse position by the payment.
Bank vA Bank 30 Md. -- II
Bank of Commerce v. Trust Association F5N.-Y. 16
Bank v. Bangs 106 Mass. -0------------
Bank v. Morgan IT'? U. S.-- -------- 2
Cocks v. Masterman 9 B .c C.------ --- 9
Corn EXchange Bank v.Ua. Bank of the Rep.78 Pa.
St.------------------ - - -10
Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany I Hill -I---- 14
Clews v. The Na. Bank 89 N1. Y- -I------ 15
Danvers v. Salem Bank 151 Mass. 24
Edwards on Bills and Notes Vol. 2 P. 599 - - 13
Ullis v. Ohio Ins. Co. 4 0. St. -------- 20
First Na. Bank v. State Bank 24 I..W.Rep. - - 20
Glouchesser v. Salem Bank 17 Mass. 12
Johnston v. Bank 27 A7. Va. -12
Levy v. Bank 4 Dallas -- 0
Kelly v. Solari 9:1.L W. - 5
Yingston Bank v. Eltinge 40 N. Y. -- 5
Markle v.Hatfield 2 John. --- 7
lMcylaroyv. Bank 14 La. An.- -23
National Bank v. National Bank 50 N. Y. - 24
National Bank v. Bank 30 N. E. Rep. ------ 25
Price v. Neal 3 Burrows 6
Park Bank v . National Bank 16 1I. Y. - 2
Peoples Bank v. Franklin Bank 88 Tenn. - -20
COuincy v. Riker '/1 Iii. -19
Ryan v. Bank 12 Ontario 25
Rouvant v. Bank 63 Tex. -20
Swift v. Tyson 16 Peters- --------- 4
Smith V. Mercer 6 Taunt. -8 22
T.3. rank v. Ba-n of Georgia 1O Wheat- -- 1I
U. S. v. Central Bank )Fed. Rep. -------- 24
1,ilconson v. Johnston 3 B. c C. ------ 9
White v. Bank 64 N. Y •- - - 24
